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Abstract
Data storage on the cloud is growing every day and many companies, administrations, and individuals are now
outsourcing storage of their data to large-scale Cloud Service Providers (CSP). However, because of today’s cloud
infrastructure virtualization, data owners cannot easily know the location where their data are stored. Even in case of
the establishment of a strong Service-Level Agreement, which includes an initial guarantee regarding data location,
the CSP may then move data to another location, like another country, in order to cut storage costs or for any other
reasons, including backup mistakes and fraudulent use of data. Data location verification is required due to legal,
privacy, and performance constraints. Recently “Where are my data located in the cloud?” has become a challenge
and solutions have been proposed to verify data location, under given assumptions regarding CSP behavior. The
objective of this paper is twofold: propose a comprehensive classification of the location verification approaches and
discuss their vulnerabilities regarding malicious CSP attacks. Location verification solutions may be Framework-based,
Hardware-based or Landmark-based. This paper addresses only landmark-based approaches for their deployment
flexibility and low cost.
Keywords: Cloud computing, Data location verification, Landmark-based approaches, Cloud storage, Security attacks
Introduction
Nowadays, cloud computing has become one of the pil-
lars for our computer-based society. The cloud provides
shared processing and data storage resources to comput-
ers and other IoT devices connected to Internet. Broadly,
cloud computing can be categorized into three classes
depending on abstraction level:
• Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS), where Cloud
Service Provider (CSP) offers “raw materials” such as
virtual machines (CPU cores, RAM) or virtual
storage. Well known IaaS are Amazon Elastic Cloud
Compute [1] and Google Compute Engine [2].
• Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS), where CSP provides a
platform allowing users to manage, create and run
applications without managing the associated
infrastructure. Well known PaaS are Heroku [3] and
Microsoft Azure [4].
*Correspondence: malik.irain@irit.fr
Toulouse Institute of Computer Science Research, University of Toulouse,
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• Software-as-a-Service (SaaS), which means that CSP
provides applications (or services) to users. Well
known SaaS are Trello [5] and Google Suite [6].
Cloud usage is growing every day and many companies,
administrations, and individuals (all of them are simply
called users in the sequel) are now outsourcing storage of
their data to large-scale distributed storage systems. Such
users are thus relieved of tasks related to the management
and maintenance of underlying storage equipment. The
counterpart is that they lose some control on their data
and they have to trust CSPs, thus resulting in some users
remaining reluctant to cloud usage. Consequently, for
the cloud to be more widely accepted, users can enforce
their requirements through QoS clauses including data
location.
Why data location should be known to data owners?
Data collecting, storage, and processing are of prime
importance in modern societies, governments, and indi-
viduals. Holding data is power whatever is the field
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(health, science, technology, national security, military, ...).
Laws applicable to data are generally the ones of CSP’s
country, which may be different or worse in contradic-
tion with the ones in data owners’ country. In addition,
because of today’s cloud infrastructure virtualization, data
owners cannot easily know locations of their data. That
is why countries worldwide require compliance with their
specific laws regarding data storage and processing.
Objectives of data protection laws [7–9] are mainly:
• Data sovereignty: governments must provide and
enforce laws to guarantee data independence to their
citizens and companies in order to avoid particularly
data access deny by foreign authorities. Indeed, in
case of conflicts between data owners’ country and
CSP’s country, the latter may totally or partially deny
data access.
• Data protection: any government must protect data
in case of war or any critical conditions, i.e.
governments must protect citizens and societies as
well as their data and do not rely on other countries
to provide the required protection.
• Privacy protection: data belonging to citizens and
strategic companies must be protected against
accesses from abroad. For example, national
companies should not store their data in other
countries where local governments could redistribute
stored data to local competitors.
In addition to data protection laws, data locationmay be
required in order to consider performance issues [10]: the
closer to users are the data, the faster is the access. Also,
when data are stored in the same country, it is easier to
find alternate routes if some routers fail, whereas between
countries Quality-of-service is easily affected in the event
of links and routers failures.
Why data location verification is needed?
When a contract is agreed between data owner and CSP,
the latter is assumed to comply with contract rules. For
example, the following is posted on AWS’s webpage: “Cus-
tomers choose the region(s) in which their customer con-
tent will be stored.Wewill not move or replicate customer
content outside of the customer’s chosen region(s), except
as legally required and as necessary to maintain the AWS
services and provide them to our customers and their end
users” [11].
However, even in case of the establishment of an SLA,
which includes an initial guarantee requirements regard-
ing data location, CSP may move data to another location,
like another country, in order to cut costs, by mistake
or for malicious reason. For example, in November 2016,
Russia’s communications regulator ordered public access
to LinkedIn’s website to be blocked to comply with a
court ruling that found the social networking firm guilty
of violating a data storage law, which stipulates the per-
sonal data of Russian users must be stored on the territory
of the Russian Federation [12]. Consequently, data users
should deploy mechanisms to verify, at any time, that their
CSP is complying with data location requirements and not
blindly trust it.
SLA and requirements on data location verification
Compliance with data protection laws requires first the
establishment of an SLA (Service Level Agreement)
between data owners and CSPs. Such SLAs should
include a data location clause, which clearly specifies
geographic location(s) where personal data may be
stored [13].
Geographic locations may be specified in various ways
using GPS coordinates or country, city, and county names.
For example, as of December 2016, AWS (Amazon Web
Services) enables its clients to specify their data storage
region according to a location list: for Europe region, data-
centers in Ireland, Frankfurt, and London may be chosen,
and for US, datacenters on East and West costs may be
chosen.
In addition to data location(s), SLA includes a list
of IP addresses or domain names, which enable users
access their data—not to verify locations. Notice that an
SLA may include an IP address of a proxy located in a
geographic region, which differs from the one of physi-
cal data server. When commercial CSPs are of concern,
proxy IP addresses do not provide (sufficient) informa-
tion to locate CSP’s data servers. Indeed, because of sys-
tem virtualization and physical infrastructure protection,
the IP addresses of physical data servers are not public.
Consequently, location verification approaches targeting
commercial CSPs should not rely on CSP’s IP addresses
and domain names included in the SLA to verify data
location.
It is worth noticing location verification approaches dif-
fer from IP-address-based geolocation (IABG) approaches
in their objectives and in the way they deploy landmarks to
collect measurements. Location verification aims to check
that data are stored in authorized geographic zone—a
country, a state, or a county—and not to check a spe-
cific data server location, while IAGB aims to find the
location associated with a given IP address. Interested
readers may refer to CAIDA website, which provides a
comprehensive—and nearly exhaustive—review of IABG
approaches [14].
Data location verification categories
Recently “Where are my data located in the cloud?”
has become a challenge and some authors proposed
approaches allowing users to verify data location
under given assumptions regarding the CSP behavior,
Irain et al. Journal of Cloud Computing: Advances, Systems and Applications  (2017) 6:31 Page 3 of 20
connection links between users and the CSP, and so
on. Those solutions and associated assumptions are
investigated in the sequel. Three location verification
approaches classes are commonly distinguished (Fig. 1):
• Cloud Framework-based approaches [15–17] aim at
providing a software framework to CSP. The latter
must use this framework, meaning that virtualization
management is done by the provided framework. The
latter replaces the software stack usually used by CSP.
Provided framework allows users to specify different
policies regarding their data. One of policies is about
data location. Such a policy specifies which locations
are allowed and which ones are forbidden, or more
specifically which data centers are allowed and which
ones are forbidden. Policies are interpreted by the
framework before any operation on data; if the
operation meets the policies it is executed, otherwise
it is rejected.
In case users do not trust CSP, Cloud
Framework-based approaches can be combined with
some hardware root of trust, administered by a third
party, to ensure the framework is really run on the
CSP. These approaches provide users with location
guarantees through the installed framework
regarding data location, but they are not, strictly
speaking, verification methods.
• Hardware-based approaches [18–20] aim at
providing a tamper-proof hardware root of trust,
attached to one or several CSP’s physical machines
that guarantees their own locations, so by linking
such a hardware to data it can guarantee data
location. Such a dedicated hardware can be remotely
accessed by users when data location verification in
required. On user’s verification request, the dedicated
hardware makes it sure data are within its scope and
replies with its location. Based on received location
from dedicated hardware, the user decides whether
the location is suitable for his/her needs.
In these approaches, hardware root of trust should be
administered by a third party, trusted by the user and
the CSP, in order to ensure correct usage and validity
of location verification results. Meaning that the third
party sets up the hardware, maintains it, plans regular
audits to check hardware presence in the right
locations and detect any misbehavior of CSP, i.e.
when the CSP would move data to another location
or succeed in breaking tamper-proof protections.
• Landmark-based approaches [10, 21–27] aim at
providing communication-based solutions to
estimate data location. Unlike previous approach
classes, landmark-based approaches are not
restrictive for CSPs, as they do not require
installation of a specific hardware or software on
CSPs. The user deploys landmarks in different known
locations, trying to surround locations in which data
are believed to be stored (see Fig. 2). Landmarks are
ordinary servers with appropriate computing power
and connected to Internet. In a first step, landmarks
interact with each other to build a distance model,
mainly based on Round-Trip Times (RTTs) between
them. This step is a training step and results in either
a regression model or a classification model. Then, on
user’s location verification request, landmarks
interact with CSP where data are assumed to be
stored to collect RTTs involving CSP. Using the
previously built learning model and new RTT
measurements, a geographic zone reflecting RTTs is
derived. CSP location should be included in the
derived zone, otherwise a malicious or accidental
move of data to another location has occurred.
In the sequel, we only address landmark-based
approaches for their flexibility and low cost. A review and
a classification of landmark-based data location verifica-
tion approaches in the cloud are proposed. Classification
is based on identification of criteria the most significant
to capture differences in the design of the most refer-
enced approaches. Their experimental results also are
introduced. Shifting data from valid location, which is the
one of CSP location included in the SLA, may result from
an accidental or malicious behavior of the CSP. In case of
malicious CSP, location verification approaches should
consider attacks coming from CSP to prevent users
discovering that their data have been moved elsewhere.
We identified potential attacks and methods to avoid or
detect them. It should be noticed that, for performance
reasons, including data access delay and robustness, data
may be stored at different locations by CSP and users are
aware of the distribution or duplication of their data. In
such a case, location verification process is designed to
verify a set a locations and not a single one. Without loss
Fig. 1 Data location verification approach classes
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Fig. 2 Structure of landmark-assisted verification approaches. Solid arrows represent verification monitoring data flow, dotted ones the
inter-landmarks measurement data flow, and dashed ones the measurements data flow between CSP and landmarks
of generality, a single location is assumed in the sequel.
Iterating the verification process described in the follow-
ing sections would contribute to consider multi-location
CSPs.
Paper organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The follow-
ing section presents our classification of location verifi-
cation approaches and their design models. In “Synthesis
of experimental results” section, we highlight the main
results derived from the experimentations carried out by
authors of reviewed approaches. In “Potential attacks on
location verification process” section, the potential attacks
on the verification process are described. “Discussion
and challenges” section discusses some challenges and
“Conclusion” section concludes the paper.
Classification of landmark-based data location
verification approaches
Location verification approaches are machine learning
(ML) based. Roughly, the idea is that if we accurately learn
about network performance regarding the zone where
CSP is assumed to be, without CSP’s participation in
learning step, then when the CSP is probed, experienced
network performance should be close or identical to the
ones observed during learning, otherwise the CSP should
be declared out of zone. More specifically, there are two
steps in location verification approaches:
• Training step: landmarks interact with each other to
collect network measurements including Round Trip
Times (RTTs), number of hops, and so on. In the
sequel, unless stated otherwise, “network
measurements” mean RTT values. Then,
measurements are used to compute parameters of a
ML model, which is used in a second step to estimate
a geographic zone associated with CSP.
• Verification step: when the user needs to verify CSP’s
location, landmarks are notified and then they
interact (sending Ping requests or accessing the data
stored on CSP) with CSP to collect RTT
measurements involving the CSP. New
measurements and the ML model established during
training step are used to derive a zone in which the
CSP is estimated to be located.
Existing approaches differ according to multiple design
criteria. In the sequel, we present our classification, which
aims at highlighting design specificities of the approaches.
As summarized on Table 1, identified design criteria are
grouped into five categories: correlation between proxy IP
address and data locations, landmark involvement in the
verification process, measurements collecting, machine
learning, and use of PDP (Proof of Data Possession)
protocol.
Definitions:
• Data location, or location in short, is the zone in
which the CSP is expected to be located.
• Location verification process, or verification
process in short, is the set of actions, including data
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Table 1 Classification of landmark-assisted data verification approaches
Correlationa Landmark Measurements collecting PDP algorithm
location / PIP@ Type Distribution
scale
Selection Metrics Probing protocol
Biswal2015 [27] Yes Active USA Nonec RTT, HCd, BWe ICMP None
Ries2011 [24] Yes Active Worldwide Nonec RTT ICMP None
Fotouhi2015 [10] Yes Active Worldwide Pre-verification RTT ICMP None
Jaiswal2016 [22] No Active USA Pre-verification RTT ICMP, HTTP None
Benson2011 [25] No Active USA Nonec RTT HTTP None
Gondree2013 [26] No Active USA Nonec RTT HTTP MAC-based
Watson2012 [21] No Active USA and Europe Pre-verification RTT HTTP MAC-based
Eskandari2014 [23] No Passiveb Worldwide Pre-training RTT HTTP None
Machine learning
Training coordination Distance estimate Location inference Location granularity
Biswal2015 [27] Centralized Nonef Naive Bayes classification County
Ries2011 [24] Centralized Virtual network coordinates Instance-based Classification Country
Fotouhi2015 [10] Decentralized Bestline Multilateration Areag
Jaiswal2016 [22] Decentralized Distance to delay ratio Multilateration GPS coordinates
Benson2011 [25] Centralized Linear regression Hierarchical clustering City
Gondree2013 [26] Decentralized Bestline Multilateration Areag
Watson2012 [21] Decentralized Linear regression Multilateration Areag
Eskandari2014 [23] Centralized Polynomial regression Multilateration GPS coordinates
aCorrelation between data location and proxy IP addresses
bThis solution deploys only passive landmarks and measurements are performed by a virtual machine located on CSP
cNone: all the landmarks in the initial set are used in the whole verification process
dHC: number of hops on route
eBW: bandwidth of route
fThe classifier returns a location rather than a distance
gThe size of the area depends on measurements
collecting, training, and location inference performed
by participating nodes.
• Probing node is any participating node, which
collects network metrics through probing requests.
• Probing request is any mechanism to collect
network metrics, including RTT. Ping, Traceroute,
and data access requests are the main forms of
probing requests.
• Verifier is the node, which coordinates verification
process and takes the final decision regarding data
location.
Correlation between Proxy IP address and data server
location
As mentioned in “Introduction” section, data owners are
aware—through SLA—of data server location(s) and IP
address(es) to access data. Reviewed location verification
approaches differ in the way they correlate IP addresses to
data server locations:
• With correlation: IP addresses included in SLA are
either those of data servers or they are associated
with proxies close to data servers. In other words,
proxies enabling data access are in the same location
than data servers. Consequently, when location
verification is of concern, probing CSP’s proxy is
equivalent to probing CSP’s data server.
• Without correlation: provided IP addresses are not
correlated to data server locations. Proxies may be
very far from data servers. Thus, their locations are
without help to locate data servers.
It is worth noticing commercial CSPs, which commonly
rely on virtualization, are more likely to follow the sec-
ond alternative to make their infrastructure transparent
regarding users and also to protect it from attacks.
Landmarks
A landmark may be any host connected to Internet and
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whose physical location is known to other landmarks
and to the Verifier. Landmarks collaborate to estimate
CSP location compared to their own locations. Location
Verification approaches differ according to tasks assigned
to landmarks.
Landmark type
Landmarks can be categorized depending on their partici-
pation in the verification process. Deployment of location
verification may involve two types of landmarks: active
and passive. Active landmarks initiate measurements, col-
lect RTT values, and may follow a learning process and
derive distance from RTT values. Passive landmarks only
reply to probing requests when they are solicited by active
landmarks to collect RTT values. All approaches analyzed
in this paper use active landmarks except the one pro-
posed in [23], which deploys only passive landmarks and
measurements are performed by a virtual machine located
on CSP.
It is worth noticing that on one hand distance accuracy
and zone estimate depends on collected data. The more
landmarks are deployed, the more measurements are col-
lected, and the more accurate are estimates. However,
the verification process should be kept at a reasonable
cost and the number of active landmarks, which agree to
collaborate, is limited on the other hand.
Landmark distribution scale
Landmark distribution scale refers to the area in which
landmarks are located. Such an area may be the Earth,
many continents, a single continent, a very large country, a
small country, or a part (i.e. a state, a region, a county...) of
a country. In [22, 25–27] continental scale is used, deploy-
ing landmarks in the USA [21] also uses a continental
scale, as landmarks are located in Europe and the USA.
[10, 23, 24] use worldwide scale.
It is worth noticing that, with a reasonable number of
landmarks and verification cost, the wider is the land-
mark area, the lower is the accuracy of distance or zone
estimate. For example, in Canada or Russia, with a radius
of 2000 km we are still in the same country, while with
the same radius, many countries are covered elsewhere in
the world. Thus, landmark distribution scale is dependent
on location granularity requirements of users (i.e. a single
country, a state...) and acceptable cost.
Landmark selection
Measurements collected by landmarks should contribute
to derive the zone of CSP location. However, all landmarks
could not provide the same contribution. For example, a
landmark too far from the others or from CSP will at best
contribute to increase variance of measurements and at
worst to derive a zone not including CSP. Landmark selec-
tion aims at finding a compromise between number and
locations of landmarks to deploy and data location esti-
mate accuracy. In the approaches analyzed in this paper,
landmark selection may be used at two levels:
• Pre-training landmark selection: first, a set of nodes
that may be used as active or passive landmarks is
considered. This set may be static or provided by
specific function (e.g., all academic websites in a
country). It is worth noticing that authors focusing
on location verification process do not take care of
this set arguing it is out of the scope of location
verification. However, a good choice of the initial set
is a key for success and accuracy of the verification
process. Then either all nodes in the initial set
participate in the training step or only a subset is
selected. Indeed, in order to minimize
communication cost of training and optimize
accuracy of zone estimate, a selection of the closest
nodes is performed and only those nodes participate
in training, as proposed in [23].
• Pre-verification landmark selection: after training
step and when the user requests location verification,
data collected by all trained landmarks and their
distance models are considered. Proposed solutions
suggest two design schemes: all collected data are
used to estimate CSP’s zone or only a subset is used.
The first scheme is easier to implement, but its
accuracy is strongly dependent on pre-training
landmark selection. The second scheme is more
adaptive and aims at discarding landmarks that
would jeopardize the verification process or results in
a too much wide zone [10, 22].
Coordination of participants’ training
Landmarks are selected to participate either as active
or passive. The latter do not collect anything. Active
landmarks may have two roles: Collecting measure-
ments and Distance estimate. When location verification
is based on landmarks, which only collect measure-
ments, the solution is centralized learning-based, because
the selection of learning models to infer the loca-
tion zone is made by the Verifier, which may be the
user machine or another delegated host. For load bal-
ancing and robustness reasons, landmarks may collect
data, learn, and estimate distances, resulting in decen-
tralized learning-based solution. Figures 3 and 4 depict
operations of centralized learning-based solutions and
Figs. 5 and 6 operations of decentralized learning-based
solutions.
Measurement collecting
Measurement collecting is the distinctive feature of
landmark-based approaches compared to other location
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guaranteeing approaches. As previously mentioned, mea-
surements are collected to fit machine learning models.
Proposed location verification solutions are categorized
according to network metrics and how they measure
them.
Metrics
Different metrics may be used to determine CSP’s loca-
tion. The most used metrics are relating to the RTT
and include raw RTT values, mean, mode, median, and
standard deviation of RTT. Hop count and bandwidth of
route between probing landmark and target node may
also be collected to enforce the accuracy of the learning
model [27].
Probing protocol
Communication protocols involved in collecting mea-
surements are useful to differentiate location verification
solutions. Mainly two schemes have been proposed: 1)
collect RTTs using mainly Traceroute or Ping commands,
both based on ICMP protocol, or 2) using data accesses
based on HTTP. The first scheme results in more accu-
rate RTTs, because in the second scheme overhead and
its variation, when data are really accessed on disks, raises
more variance in observed RTTs. It is worth noticing that
the second scheme is useful when the verification pro-
cess collects RTTs during data accesses by applications,
which minimizes communication cost of the verification
process, and also when the prober wants to check that
data are really on the responding server (see Attacks
in “Potential attacks on location verification process”
section). ICMP messages are used in [10, 27]. HTTP mes-
sages are used in [21, 23, 25, 26]. Both message types are
used in [22].
Distance estimate
When network-related metrics, mainly RTTs, are col-
lected, decentralized learning-based approaches use them
to infer a distance between each probing landmark and
CSP’s location. Roughly, distance estimate is a function
f that takes measurements M as input and returns a
distance d: d = f (M).
There are several ways to select f function:
• using linear regression [21, 25],
• using polynomial regression [23],
• using a delay to distance ratio, which corresponds to
the average of measured delay between landmarks
over distance between probed hosts [22],
• deriving a bestline, which is a line with the highest
intercept and slope such that all measured values are
above the line [10, 26].
It is worth noticing that each of the above ways to select
estimate function has its pros and cons from the statistical
analysis point view. Indeed, it is well known, in the sta-
tistical analysis field, that selection of a regression model
and its parameters depends on characteristics of observed
data and the estimate error bound. Selecting the optimal
estimate function is still a challenge, which is out of the
scope of this paper.
Instead of inferring a function giving Cartesian distance
between a couple of nodes, a function mapping nodes to
virtual coordinates according to measurements can also
be considered. Virtual coordinate systems (VCS), such as
Vivaldi, Pharos, and Phoenix, are schemes proposed to
locate hosts in the Internet. Based on dedicated land-
marks, VCSs map nodes into a geometric space in such
a way that their distance in the VCS represents latency
Fig. 3 Training step (centralized approach)
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Fig. 4 Verification step (centralized approach)
between them in the physical network. Thus, distance
between two hosts in the virtual coordinate space is a
equivalent to RTT between these hosts. An example of
approach based on VCS is proposed in [24], which uses
Phoenix virtual coordinates system.
Depending on landmark training of the solution under
consideration, a single distance estimate function is built
by the Verifier using all collected data or each landmark
builds its distance estimate function using its own col-
lected data and then sends its estimated distance to the
Verifier. The first scheme is called centralized distance
estimate and the second decentralized distance estimate.
Decentralized distance estimate functions are proposed in
[23–25] and centralized ones in the other solutions except
for [27] that does not include any distance estimate func-
tion. As far as we know, distance estimate functions built
locally by landmarks differ only in their parameters and
not in their forms, i.e. all distance estimate functions used
by landmarks may be linear, polynomial and so on, but
without mix.
Location inference
Location inferencemethod
Location Verifier performs the last task, which is inference
of a CSP zone based on learning step and measurements
involving the CSP. Zone inference depends on learning
coordination:
• Location inference in centralized learning-based
approaches: classification is mainly used in these
approaches. Inter-landmarks measurements are used
by the Verifier to fit a classifier; it is the learning step.
Then, measurements between landmarks and CSP are
used to predict CSP’s location zone. Different types of
ML classification may be used, including Naive Bayes,
Instance-based learning, and Hierarchical clustering.
• Location inference in decentralized learning-based
approaches: multilateration is used in such
approaches. Recall that prior to this final step,
landmarks sent their distance estimates. Let n be the
number of active landmarks, (xi, yi) the coordinates
Fig. 5 Training step (decentralized approach)
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Fig. 6 Verification step (decentralized approach)
of landmark i, and di the estimated distance between
landmark i and CSP. A circle, with (xi, yi) as center
and di as radius, is associated with landmark i.
Multilateration is the function which takes as input a
set of n circles and returns a zone, which is a polygon
with a maximum of n sides, formed by the
intersection of those circles. Then, interpretation of
the yielded zone may result in a city, a country, a
continent, etc. Figures 7 and 8 show examples of
multilateration result.
Among reviewed solutions, the ones proposed in
[24, 25, 27] use classification and the others use
multilateration.
Location granularity
At the end of location verification process, a result is
returned to data owner. Very fine granularity is reached
when the result is in the form of GPS coordinates
[22, 23], a city [25] or a county [27]. Coarse granular-
ity is reached when the result is a country [24] or a
continent. Some solutions, including [10, 21, 26], pro-
vide a very variable granularity depending on variance
in measurements; granularity may vary from very fine to
coarse.
Location granularity is a quantitative property of loca-
tion verification process. Not all users require the same
granularity. Many users only need their data to be located
in their country and do not want to pay too much to
receive verification result. As location verification pro-
cess is based onmachine learning, all estimates come with
errors, thus the probability that CSP is in the inferred
zone grows with the zone size. Under this observation, a
very fine location granularity constraint may jeopardize
location verification process and provides false negative.
In other words, location verification result interpretation
would be “CSP is not in the authorized area” with a narrow
zone, while it would be “CSP is in the authorized area”
with a wider zone.
Proof of data possession protocol (PDP) utilization
PDP protocol is a protocol that allows data owners to ver-
ify that their data are actually stored on a data server.
It consists of four main operations: data pre-processing,
inquiry, response, and check. There are two main design
schemes for PDP protocols:
• Message authentication code (MAC) based scheme:
data owner pre-processes data, generating a tag Ti for
each block Bi of data using a hash function H().
Then, tags are stored by data owner and data blocks
are sent to data server to be stored. When data owner
needs to verify that the data server has the data, it
sends a PDP inquiry including a list of c randomly
selected block numbers. Data server reads and sends
the requested data blocks. Then, data owner
computes tags for received data blocks and compares
them to tags locally-stored to confirm or not the
possession proof. It is worth noticing that
MAC-based PDP is bandwidth consuming,
depending on the number of blocks included in proof
inquiries and the frequency of these inquiries.
MAC-based scheme is used in [21, 26].
• Cryptography-based scheme: to avoid bandwidth
consumption incurred by the previous scheme, one
of the well-known solutions has been proposed in
[28], which may be summarized as follows:
– Data owner generates a private key and a
public key. Then, it associates a tag Ti with
each data block Bi—tag calculation is based on
the private key—and it sends data blocks and
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Fig. 7 Example of perfect multilateration. di the estimated distance between Landmarki and CSP is the same as the real one. Circles intersect at a point
associated tags to the server. Data owner may
delete data and tags.
– When data owner needs to check the data
server, it sends a PDP request including the
public key and a challenge composed of a list
of c data block numbers randomly selected
and a random value r. Using random block
numbers and a random value r prevents the
server from anticipating which blocks will be
queried in each challenge, and also prevents it
from storing combinations (e.g., sums) of
original blocks instead of the original file
blocks themselves.
– Then, data server accesses c data blocks and
uses the public key to generate a proof of
possession composed of a tag and a hashed
value of r. Notice that the data server cannot
generate a valid possession proof without
accessing the data file.
– Data owner receives the possession proof.
Then it uses its private key to conclude
whether the possession proof is valid or not.
As shown on Table 1, reviewed approaches don’t use
cryptographic-based PDP. We do recommend such a
PDP scheme instead of MAC-based one as it is more
robust and less resource consuming.
It is worth noticing that PDP protocols are mech-
anisms to provide guarantees that the responding
server has the data, but do not provide guarantees
on data location. Thus, usually PDP protocols are
used jointly with other mechanisms, such as RTT col-
lecting and checking, to provide a complete location
verification.
Synthesis of experimental results
Papers addressed in this review include experimenta-
tions in order to assess performance of proposed location
verification approaches under real scenarios. To provide
comparison of analyzed approaches, distance error and
verification success rate, as well as experimentation con-
texts, are taken from the original papers and summed up
in Table 2. It should be noted that the presented results are
the ones claimed by approaches’ authors.
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Fig. 8 Example of multilateration where returned zone is a triangle. di the estimated distance between Landmarki and CSP is different from rdi the
real one
Biswal et al.’s approach
Described experimentation was based on a set of 67
Planetlab nodes, acting as landmarks, which interacted
with 23,843 US routers with known locations. Data
files were uploaded on Amazon, Rackspace and Google
cloud storages. For each storage service, the associ-
ated IP addresses were discovered by downloading files.
Then, each landmark probed discovered IP addresses and
collected measurements including RTT, hop count, and
bandwidth. Results show that using standard deviation,
mean, and hop count results in better accuracy than using
the mean alone and that adding the mode and median
values does not result in any accuracy improvement. In
case of Amazon CSP, 95% of predictions have less than
1.6 km error and 100% have less than 64 km error. In
case of Rackspace and Google, almost 100% of predic-
tions have less than 1.6 km error and 100% is reached
with respectively less than 2253 km error and 1609 km
error. When bandwidth measurements are considered,
100% of Amazon predictions have negligible distance
error.
Ries et al.’s approach
The authors used 80 to 89 Planetlab nodes acting as land-
marks and distributed in 28 countries. Collected RTTs
were used to build an VCS (Virtual Coordinate Sys-
tem) model. Three VCSs—namely, Pharos, Vilvadi, and
Phoenix—and two classification algorithms—Instance-
Based Learning and Support Vector Machine—have been
compared. Each landmark acted as a CSP to collect RTTs
and could use a proxy. The latter impacts distance error.
RTT measures were used together with the VCS to com-
pute a virtual position for the landmark acting as a CSP.
The location was then estimated thanks to the classifica-
tion algorithm and the virtual position of other landmarks.
When associated with Phoenix VCS, the best classifica-
tion algorithm is Instance-Based Learning. Support Vec-
tor Machine works better with Pharos and Vivaldi VCSs.
Phoenix outperforms the other VCSs. Without a proxy,
success rate is 90% for Phoenix, 80% for Pharos, and 65%
for Vivaldi. With a proxy, success rate is 50% for Phoenix,
40% for Pharos, and 30% for Vivaldi. Thus, including a
proxy has a significant impact on distance error improve-
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Table 2 Experimental contexts and results of landmark-based data verification approaches
Experimentation context Results
Number of Type of Distribution Used
Settingsb
Success
Granularity
Distance
landmarks landmarks scale genuine CSP rate error (km)
Biswal2015 [27] 67 Planetlab USA
Amazon
Mean, std and HC 95.00% County 1.6
100% County 64
Rackspace
99.99% County 1.6
100% County 2253
Google
99.99% County 1.6
100% County 1609
Amazon
Mean, std
100% County 1.6
HC and BW
Ries2011 [24] 80 - 89 Planetlab Worldwide Nonea Phoenix, no proxy 90% Country
Pharos, no proxy 80% Country
Vivaldi, no proxy 65% Country
Phoenix, proxy 50% Country
Vivaldi, proxy 40% Country
Pharos, proxy 30% Country
Fotouhi2015 [10] 9 Amazon VM Worldwide Google 100% Areac 240
Jaiswal2016 [22] 60 Planetlab USA
Nonea 100% GPS coord. 88.5
Amazon 100% GPS coord. 112.7
Benson2011 [25] 36 Planetlab USA Nonea 100% City 441.6
Gondree2013 [26] 50 Planetlab USA Nonea
50%
Area of
166
171,819 km2
90%
Area of
626
1,960,510 km2
Amazon
Min RTT 100%
Area of
11,175 km2
Median RTT 100%
Area of
243,791 km2
Watson2012 [21] 28 Planetlab
USA and
Nonea
Europe
50% Centroid coord. 800
75% Centroid coord. 1000
Europe
North America
50% Centroid coord. 1000
75% Centroid coord. 1200
Eskandri2014 [23] 38,892 Websites Worldwide Nonea Landmarks
100% GPS coord. 100
at <100 km
Landmarks
100% GPS coord. 600
at <1000 km
aNone: a landmark simulating a CSP is used
bSettings: tested options in estimate functions, system architecture, and node deployment
cThe area considered in the experimentation is the border between two US states
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ment. However, the authors notice that increasing the
number of landmarks does not necessarily improve the
distance error beyond a threshold.
Fotouhi et al.’s approach
Nine Amazon virtual machines, in 9 different locations,
were used as landmarks. RTT measurements were used
to build a bestline for each landmark. A virtual machine
has been deployed on Google cloud. Such a VM was
assumed to be located in the USA, so landmarks out-
side the USA were ignored. Remaining landmarks sent
requests to the VM to measure RTT, each one using
its own function on measured RTTs to estimate its
distance to the VM. Using estimated distances and a
multilateration algorithm, a location has been derived.
Provided results show a distance error of 240 km along
the border between two US states. It should be noticed
that a single landmark close to data server was cho-
sen to reach such an error, which is the best one in
experimentation.
Jaiswal & Kumar’s approach
Sixty Planetlab nodes were selected to be used as land-
marks. Two experimentations have been carried out,
using a landmark simulating a CSP or an Amazon CSP.
Reported distance error is 88.5 km in case of simulated
CSP and 112.7 km for Amazon CSP. The increase in
distance error is due the density of landmarks used in
both experimentations. There were less landmarks around
Amazon CSP.
Benson et al.’s approach
Thirty six Planetlab nodeswere used.Three delay-to-distance
estimate models (based on 49 light speed, global bestline,
and linear regression) have been tested. Using selected
delay-to-distance estimate models, landmarks estimated
their distance to 40 university websites—assuming uni-
versities host their websites. Experimentation results
show that the global bestline based model outperforms
other models and has an average distance error of
441.6 km.
Gondree & Peterson’s approach
Fifty Planetlab nodes were chosen to be landmarks acting
as CSPs. Minimum RTTs resulting from data block trans-
fer between landmarks have been used to build a bestline
estimatemodel. Then, local estimated distances have been
used to apply a multilateration algorithm, which returned
the estimated location.
Two experimentation results were reported, a first
experimentation using a simulated CSP and a second
using an Amazon CSP. In the first experimentation,
results show that 90% of predictions locate the centroid
within 626 km margin in an area of 1,960,510 km2)
and 50% within 166 km margin in an area of
171,819 km2.
In the second experimentation, data blocks were stored
on Amazon CSP. In case of using minimum RTT values,
the best obtained area surrounding the estimated location
is 11,175 km2. However, obtained area is 243,791 km2 with
median RTT values. No distance error was provided.
Watson et al.’s approach
Eighteen North American Planetlab nodes and 10
European Planetlab nodes were used as landmarks. Each
landmark acted as a CSP and all the others sent 50
requests from which only the minimum RTT is kept to
build a delay-to-distance function using linear regres-
sion. One experimentation deployed a server in Europe
and another one in North America. Using estimated dis-
tances and multilateration algorithm, coordinates of zone
centroid were predicted.
Provided results indicate that varying PDP parameters
did not impact the error rate. In Europe, for 50% of pre-
diction tests, the error was less than 800 km and for 75%
tests, the error was less than 1000 km. In the USA, for 50%
of tests, the error was less than 1000 km and for 75% it was
less than 1200 km.
Eskandari et al.’s approach
A virtual machine on CSP runs location verification
process. VM interacted with landmarks sending HTTP
requests to measure RTTs. Among a set of 38,892 websites
with known locations and located within 1000 km range,
at least 500 were selected to build a delay-to-distance
function using polynomial regression. Data server was
located in Trento, Italy. Results show an increase of error
with the range of landmark selection. When the range is
100 km, the error is 40 km; a higher range of 1000 km
results in a 600 km error.
We would like to notice that the included results are
ambiguous. Distance error value is not clear, because
two graphs are provided. One graph shows a compar-
ison with other approaches and the second one is a
self-comparison with different parameter values. Unfor-
tunately, reported results are not coherent. On the first
graph, estimate error is 100 km with 1000 km range,
while it is 600 km with 1000 km range on the second
graph.
Potential attacks on location verification process
In order to tamper landmark-based location verification,
a malicious CSP may implement different attacks depend-
ing on location verification approach. The goal of mali-
cious CSP’s attacks is to hide real data location. Instead of
storing data in the agreed location, the CSP moves data
to another location, possibly another country, where the
user does not want his/her data to be stored and the CSP
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tries to hide this fact to user. In such a case, the CSP is
considered malicious and it deliberately implements spe-
cific attacks. Data movements would be undertaken to cut
costs or for intelligence reasons. In the first case, CSP is
economically rational: it would take some risks by mov-
ing data to an unauthorized location, but it does so only
if storage cost is significantly reduced. The second case
refers to various spying forms.
The main types of attacks regarding landmark-based
location verification process are summarized in Fig. 9 and
briefly presented below. Some attacks may be avoided by
design; for example attacks on virtual machine are avoided
when the user does not deploy any VM in location verifi-
cation process. Some other attacks may only be detected;
for example, RTT manipulation. Finally, some complex
and/or costly attacks have not yet been considered in the
literature.
Blocking verification
Attack principle
This basic attack is to prevent location verification process
to complete; it is a type of denial-of-service. In this attack,
access to CSP’s resources is blocked for location verifica-
tion process. There are two parts of location verification
process that can be blocked by the CSP:
• Landmark blacklisting: CSP detects landmarks
participating in location verification process and
blacklists them because they are potential witnesses
of malicious CSP’s behavior. By preventing
landmarks to collect RTT measurements, the
verification process is blocked.
• Trace service blocking: the most common way to
measure RTTs is to use ICMP queries. Under the
pretext of security or performance reasons, CSP may
decide to block ICMP queries. Any other protocol
that is not the one enabled by the CSP to access data
may also be blocked.
Solution
There are different solutions for this type of attack
depending on what is blocked:
• Landmark blacklisting: there are three main solutions
to avoid landmark blacklisting. The first is that user
and CSP agree on a list of landmarks that will be used
to verify data location. In such a case, CSP is aware of
the existence of location verification and should
avoid data off-shoring; the user is saying to CSP “I am
watching you”. The second one, which is used when
the user wants to keep the verification secrete, is to
activate multiple legitimate machines, which are
authorized to access the data on CSP, and then collect
RTT values. The third solution is to randomly select,
at each training initialization time, landmarks among
a very large set of nodes making it either infeasible or
very costly for the CSP to blacklist all those nodes.
• Trace service blocking: to overcome trace service
blocking, the user and some landmarks may collect
RTT values while accessing data stored on CSP. It is
assumed here that CSP cannot learn about the
objectives of data accesses (i.e., when the user is really
exploiting data or when data access is just an alibi to
derive RTT values).
Usingmalicious proxy
Attack principle
CSP installs a proxy located at a user-authorized loca-
tion included in SLA and stores data at another location.
Then probing and data access queries are answered by the
proxy, thus persuading the user that his/her data are at
the right location. Such an attack is implemented differ-
ently depending on interactions between the verification
process and the data access process:
• No interaction: location verification and data access
processes are independent, i.e. the Verifier does not
rely on data accesses to verify the location. In such a
case, the verification process only considers
network-related metrics, such as RTT, and the proxy
only needs to reply to ICMP queries instead of the
CSP. After a wave of RTT collecting what is
estimated by location process is a proxy location,
which is interpreted as valid location by the verifier
resulting in a false positive. Later, when an access to
data is requested, the query is transmitted by the
proxy to the real data location node, which then
sends requested data to the proxy, and then the proxy
sends these data to the requesting node.
• With interaction: in this case, location process
collects RTTs while accessing data. Thus, the proxy
cannot maliciously behave as previously unless it
deploys data caching or special high-speed
connections, which are other attack types presented
Fig. 9 Potential attacks on the verification process
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later. Assuming no data caching and no special
connection, the proxy may deploy attacks on location
verification process if it is able to learn about data
accesses and to classify them into two categories: i)
data accesses used only for location verification
process and the content of read data is not relevant,
only RTTs matter, and ii) data accesses where
content is relevant but no RTTs are collected. Under
the assumption that such a learning is feasible, when
a data request is received, the proxy needs to classify
it as request type i orii. When a request is classified as
type i, the proxy forges a random data and sends it to
the requesting node and when it is classified as
type ii, a remote access to data server is made to
receive authentic data, which are then sent to the
requesting node. Consequently, location verification
decision results in a false positive. It is worth noticing
that this attack is potentially feasible only when the
proxy is aware of the verification process details and
data accesses have specific patterns (e.g., each first
day of week location verification process is run).
Solution
Potential solutions to face this attack type are as follows:
• No interaction between the Verifier and Data access
processes: to avoid proxy malicious behavior, a Proof
of Data Possession (PDP) should be deployed to have
guarantees that data are located on the responding
proxy.
• With interaction: a first solution is to deploy a PDP as
in the previous case. A second is to make the CSP
unable to learn objectives of data accesses to detect
those accesses used only to collect RTT
measurements and those where the content matters
for user’s applications. This may be achieved by an
appropriate sequencing of data queries.
Virtual machine misappropriation
Attack principle
In the cloud context, not only users’ data are stored by the
CSP but also user’s programsmay run on virtual machines
(VM) hosted by CSP. In such a case, both data and loca-
tion verifier are on CSP. It is worth noting that the user
may choose to host, on the same CSP, totally or par-
tially the tasks composing location verification process.
Truthful CSPs run their clients’ programs without any
interference or attacks. However, when a CSP is malicious,
it may force location verification tasks on its hosted virtual
machines to send invalid data to derive current data loca-
tion when the CSP has changed data location while not
allowed by the user to do so. The VM may also be moved
by a malicious CSP.
Solution
To avoid VM misappropriation by a malicious CSP, the
simplest way is not to use VM to implement location veri-
fier. Rather, location verifier should be hosted on a private
machine owned by the user or on a trusted third party.
However, if for any good reasons regarding user’s prefer-
ences or requirements, location verifier is hosted by the
CSP, the user must deploy on the CSP a trusted hardware,
such as a Trusted Platform Module, to prevent CSP to
manipulate the hosted VMs [29].
Forging RTT
Attack principle
RTT forgery is one of the basic attacks that may be used
by a malicious CSP to obfuscate landmark-based loca-
tion verification approaches. When location verifier tries
to collect RTT values to derive CSP’s location, it sends
requests (Pings or data accesses) to CSP. Then, the latter
delays or handles the request with a higher priority—
which results in lower RTT values—so that collected RTT
values either will not help the verifier to derive current
CSP location or worst the verifier derives the agreed
data location (i.e., the location included in SLA). It is
worth noticing that decreasing RTT based attacks are
muchmore complex than the ones that randomly increase
the RTT. Two types of RTT forgery may be used by
the CSP:
• Random RTT forgery: the amount of waiting time
upon reception of a Ping or data request, in order to
increase/decrease RTT, is randomly generated. This
causes RTTs to appear totally uncorrelated to the
distance between landmarks and CSP and location
verification process fails, so data may be stored
anywhere.
• Requester-location-aware RTT forgery: assuming the
CSP has a certain knowledge on location verification
approach and on locations and roles of landmarks,
the waiting time to increase/decrease the RTT is
forged depending on origin of the query (i.e., the
landmark originating the request), so that data appear
to be stored at the location included in the SLA and
not at the current CSP location. By forging RTT
values, the centroid of the zone where data are
assumed to be is deliberately changed. Using this
process, CSP may move the centroid where it wants.
Detection and solution
RTT forgery attacks can be detected or avoided depending
on how RTTs are forged:
• Random RTT forgery: it might be reasonably
assumed that CSP would increase/decrease RTTs
only for verification queries, otherwise CSP outgoing
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traffic will be impacted resulting in QoS degradation.
Under this observation, location verifier may detect
RTT forgery by comparing RTTs values measured by
a set of selected landmarks around the CSP. Thus,
RTT forgery detection may be implemented using
cooperative RTT measurements and statistical
learning on RTT samples to detect the forged
random part of RTTs computed at different
landmarks. Another way to detect RTT forgery is
when the zone inferred from forged RTT
measurements is too wide [30].
• Requester-location-aware RTT forgery: this attacks
assumes the CPS is aware of landmarks’ roles and
positions and how RTTs values are used in location
verification process to forge fake ones. To avoid this
attack, a solution is to randomly select, at each
training step initialization time, landmarks among a
very large set of nodes, which makes it either
infeasible or very costly for CSP to learn and deploy
an RTT forgery for each participating landmark.
Caching data
Attack principle
This attack may be used to obfuscate the deployment of a
PDP (Proof of Data Possession) protocol. Recall that PDPs
are mechanisms to face malicious proxies. In caching data
attack, CSP stores most of the data at a remote location
while storing in its local cache data needed by location
verification process. When a data access request is for
location verification, CSP fetches data in its local cache,
otherwise the request is forwarded to the remote node
of data storage before sending a response to user. This
attack is feasible only under the assumption that the CSP
is able learn which parts of the data are used in the ver-
ification process in order to cache them and which parts
are used by the conventional applications of the user in
order to store them in another location. Notice that the
data caching attack is different from the “With interac-
tion” attack of a malicious proxy. In the latter, data used in
the location verification are not relevant to the user so the
proxy generates any data to answer the request, while in
the caching attack data are used both by location verifica-
tion process and by conventional user’s applications.
Solutions
There are two alternatives to face this type of attack:
• Avoidance by design: to make the CSP unable (at a
reasonable cost) to discover which parts of data are
used in the verification, location verification process
should associate an RTT with each data access
request (whatever the use of data) and then use all
RTTs to derive data location or randomly select data
blocks to be used in location verification process.
• Detection: under the assumption that RTTs collected
for cached data and other data are different—because
when the CSP moves data it would result in RTT
increase—, the Verifier may check the variability of
RTTs between both sets of data and detect potential
attacks.
Concealed high-speed connections
Attack principle
CSP is aware of the user’s behavior, which shows that the
user relies on RTT measured during data access to derive
CSP location. CSP chooses a node at location X, using an
appropriate high-speed network, such that delay access
between CSP and the chosen node is negligible compared
to the variation of RTT between the CSP and user. CSP
stores data at the location X. Then, when the user sends
data access requests to CSP, the latter reads data from
location X and then forwards them to the user. It is worth
noticing that this attack may also be used by a malicious
proxy even though a PDP is deployed (seeMalicious proxy
attack).
Solution
As far as we know, there is no solution to thwart this
attack, which is very costly to malicious CSPs. However,
it can be noticed that distance between any locations is
limited by the delay induced by network connection. Even
with a private connection, the speed is limited to 23c, with
c the speed of light in vacuum. Considering this limit and
necessary round-trip for a request between two nodes,
moving the data of 1000 kmwould result in 10ms increase
of RTT. RTT overhead would probably be seen by loca-
tion Verifier. Notice that 1000 km may not be a problem
depending on the radius of the acceptable zone for storing
data in a country or in a set of states...
Vulnerabilities of reviewed approaches
Vulnerabilities of reviewed approaches are summarized in
Table 3, which shows the following:
• All approaches are vulnerable to landmark blocking,
except [23], which uses a very large set of landmarks
making it very costly to a malicious CSP to block the
verification process.
• Approaches in [10, 24, 27] are vulnerable to trace
service blocking and to malicious proxy without
interaction, because they use ICMP requests to probe
CSP. The other approaches are able to avoid both
attacks as they use only data accesses to collect RTTs.
• Approaches in [22, 25] are vulnerable to malicious
proxy attack with interaction, because they access
data with HTTP to collect RTTs, but do not check the
validity of received data. Approaches in [10, 24, 27]
are not vulnerable to malicious proxy, because no
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Table 3 Vulnerabilities to attacks of analyzed approaches
Blocking Malicious VM Forging Caching Concealed
verification proxy misappropriation RTT data connection
Landmarks Trace
service
No
interaction
With
interaction
Random Requester-
location
aware
Biswal2015 [27] × × × × × × ×
Ries2011 [24] × × × × × × ×
Fotouhi2015 [10] × × × × × × × ×
Jaiswal2016 [22] × × × × × ×
Benson2011 [25] × × × × × ×
Gondree2013 [26] × × × ×
Watson2012 [21] × × × ×
Eskandari2014 [23] × × × × ×
×: the proposed solution is vulnerable to the attack; an empty case means no vulnerability
data accesses are made. Approaches in [21, 26] avoid
such an attack owing to PDP protocol utilization. In
[23], landmarks are passive and location verification
is hosted on a VM of the CSP with trusted location,
consequently, it has capabilities to avoid proxy attack.
• Approaches in [10, 23] are vulnerable to VM
misappropriation, because they are partially (in [10])
or totally (in [23]) VM-dependent.
• All approaches are vulnerable to RTT forgery, to data
caching attack—except [21, 26], owing to PDP
protocol—, and to concealed connection attack.
In conclusion, reviewed location verification app-
roaches are (very) far from being robust to prevent mali-
cious CSP’s attacks.
Discussion and challenges
Landmark selection
Most of existing approaches do not select landmarks
except when building the initial landmark set, which
is often considered out of the scope of location verifi-
cation approaches. However, initial landmark set selec-
tion is of prime importance, as the quality of results
directly depends on measurements provided by land-
marks. One should not choose landmarks with too much
randomness in the quality of network connection, oth-
erwise measurements would experience high variance,
resulting in a wider location zone. An exciting challenge
for next generation location verification solutions would
be the proposal of machine learning based approaches,
which dynamically adapt landmark set according to the
required granularity of data location and to observed
network traffic conditions.
RTT-distance mapping function
Almost all of approaches are based on RTT-to-distance
mapping functions assuming that:
1. RTT between two locations is proportional to the
distance between those two locations.
2. The routing path between two locations
approximately fits the direct geodesic distance
between these locations.
Authors of solutions summarized in Table 1 present
experimentation results to assess their models. However,
they mainly consider specific scenarios in the USA where
the previous assumptions might be realistic. Unfortu-
nately, both assumptions are far from being realistic
worldwide in most of cases where location verification
may be of concern. For instance, we collected mea-
surements during a long period (two months) between
hosts in France and between hosts in France and in
Germany, Canada, Africa, and USA. None of collected
measurement sets has confirmed any of the assumptions.
One significant example to be reported is relating to
measurements between Toulouse (France) and hosts in
Frankfurt and Berlin, deutschland.de, goethe-university-
frankfurt.de, and fu-berlin.de. RTT regarding Goethe
University’s website is around 56 ms and it is around
65 ms for the second host in Frankfurt, while both
hosts are in the same city. RTT is around 67 ms for
the host in Berlin. While Berlin is over 400 km far-
ther from Toulouse than Frankfurt, observed RTTs are
nearly similar. The assumption that RTT is proportional
to distance seldom holds and regression functions to
estimate distances proposed in almost all analyzed
solutions are too far from the reality of current Inter-
net latencies. One challenge would be the proposal of
learning approaches, which combine at least the net-
work topology—including the number of hops between
landmarks—and RTTs for each couple of hosts. Using the
same estimate function and with the same parameters for
all hosts would result in too much error from statistical
point of view. Context-aware approaches are required
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to enable different classes of users to accurately locate
their data.
Location inference
Multilateration-based approaches
More than a half of analyzed approaches use multilat-
eration jointly with a RTT-distance mapping function.
Among those approaches, two consider the centroid
point—i.e., GPS coordinates—of the area yielded by mul-
tilateration [22, 23]. The latter assumes “nearly perfect”
estimate function and measurements. In case of inac-
curate measurements, the resulting centroid would be
invalid and location verification process inconclusive.
Those approaches also are very vulnerable to RTT forgery
attacks. The remaining multilateration-based approaches
return a zone, so they could detect RTT forging attack.
Assuming RTT is proportional to distance, the best repre-
sentative value associated with the distance is the lowest
RTT as proposed in bestline-based solutions [10, 26].
However, the minimum RTT value has a very low prob-
ability of occurrence when the current Internet is of
concern. Using the lowest RTT value would result in an
underestimate of distance either in the training step or
in verification step, thus preventing the multilateration
function to return a useful zone. Indeed, two behaviors
may occur:
1. During training step the minimum value of RTT is
not observed, while it is during verification step,
resulting in a short predicted distance. In such a case,
circles representing distance between landmarks and
CSP do not intersect.
2. The minimum value of RTT is observed during
training, while only high RTT values are observed
during verification step. In this case, multilateration
function would return a very wide zone, thus
jeopardizing accuracy of verification result.
One challenge would be a statistical analysis of multilat-
eration accuracy in large landmark sets with high variance
in the RTT values.
Classification-based approaches
It is well known that classification techniques are more
powerful in decision making, when they use a sufficient
number of features to discriminate samples. Unfortu-
nately, in location verification approaches, almost all clas-
sification methods use a single feature, which is RTT.
When only RTTs are used in training step, at verification
step, a set of collected RTT involving a target host H, may
be associated with multiple classes—so multiple hosts
may be predicted as target and not only hostH—, because
many probing hosts may experience similar RTT values.
Indeed, multiple zones in the world or in a same country
may have similar latencies. A first challenge would be the
investigation of other metrics, in addition to RTT, number
of hops and bandwidth, to better classify collected mea-
surements and reduce overlap between classes. A second
challenge would be to test in parallel multiple classifica-
tion models and to select the best one, which dynamically
better matches observed measurements. It is worth notic-
ing that testing simultaneously different learning models,
for the same training and testing data, is a well known
practice in machine learning. Such a practice is not, as far
as we know, sufficiently addressed in location verification
approaches.
Proofs of data possession
It is worth noticing that without guarantees that any
server replying to probing requests is the right one, col-
lected RTT measurements are useless to location verifi-
cation process. As shown in Table 1, only two solutions
include Proof of Data Possession protocols. It is sur-
prising that PDP protocols are not prevalent in existing
approaches. As already outlined, PDP protocols provide
powerful mechanisms to trust collected measurements
regarding RTT. One challenge would be an analysis of
PDP cost regarding frequency of PDP checks. In particu-
lar, adequately increasing frequency of PDP checks makes
it economically unprofitable for a malicious CSP to move
data between two PDP checks. Indeed, a malicious CSP,
which is aware of the period between two successive PDP
checks, when this period is very high—e.g., more than one
month—would be tempted to move data to another loca-
tion between two PDP checks. Doing so, a malicious CSP
would bring back data just when a possession proof is to
be built and then it relocates data.
Accuracy and granularity of location
First of all, let us recall that all the proposed location
verification solutions are based on statistical approaches,
which come with estimate errors, in particular due to vari-
ance in collected RTT values. Controlling errors of dis-
tance estimate functions and location decision functions
is very challenging. Some users would like to know the
finest granularity (i.e., the data center’s GPS coordinates
or address) with the highest accuracy (i.e., with a mini-
mum error margin). Unfortunately, landmark-based loca-
tion verification approaches are intrinsically less accurate
than other methods of location guaranteeing, in particular
hardware-based methods. So one should find a compro-
mise in terms of granularity (e.g., a city, a country, and
so on), accuracy within the admitted granularity (e.g., a
few km, hundreds of km, and so on), and verification
cost. A final challenge we would like to rise is to asso-
ciate with each solution decision result, not only a location
zone, but also probability of success to quantify how the
yielded result should be trusted by users. The latter may
Irain et al. Journal of Cloud Computing: Advances, Systems and Applications  (2017) 6:31 Page 19 of 20
be happy with an answer such as “data are in London city
with a margin of 100 km”, but unhappy with an answer like
“data are in London city with a margin of 100 km with a
probability of 0.53”. Location verification approaches we
analyzed do not (or marginally) consider such a challenge.
Conclusion
Data location in the cloud is one of the primary con-
cerns for cloud users and it became a challenge. Many
solutions have been proposed to verify data location. This
paper presents a survey of the most referenced landmark-
based data location verification approaches, which are
flexible, low cost, and not restrictive for CSPs, as they do
not require installation of dedicate software of hardware
in CSPs. First, we present a comprehensive classifica-
tion criteria for those approaches. Identified criteria are
grouped into five categories: correlation between proxy IP
address and data location, landmark involvement in the
verification process, measurements collecting, machine
learning, and PDP protocol deployment. After classifica-
tion of these approaches, experimental setup and results
produced by their authors are detailed. Then, the criteria
guide identification of potential attacks that a malicious
CSP might implement to jeopardize the location verifica-
tion process.Malicious CSP relocates data on data servers,
which are not authorized by users, and then tries to make
them believe their data are on the location agreed in SLA.
We briefly describe some solutions to overcome attacks
or detect them. Finally, we discuss limitations and draw-
backs of existing solutions and identity some challenges
that require further investigation in the future. Location
verification still remains an open and exciting issue in the
cloud computing research field.
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